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Sidebar - interesting tid bit from ISC SANS site

http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=6253

A couple interesting points from John Bambeck at SANS regarding a talk he is preparing on data leakage prevention and what controls have been established as "reasonable security" to protect trade secrets and/or non-public information.

I like John's list of what he considers to be some of the general requirements (based on previous Federal Trade Commission actions mostly).

  • Use of encryption with data at rest and in transit, both within and outside the organization
  • Limiting access to wireless networks
  • Use of strong passwords (and multiple passwords) for administrators to access systems and networks
  • Limit access of internal systems to the internet
  • Employ measures to detect and prevent unauthorized access
  • Conduct security investigations, as appropriate
  • Patching and Updating of anti-virus
  • Requiring periodic changes to passwords
  • Locking accounts after too many failed attempts at logging in
  • Storing credentials in insecure formats (i.e. cookies in the clear)
  • Use of secure transit for credentials (i.e. HTTPS / SSH)
  • Forbidding sharing of accounts
  • Regular assessment of networks and applications for security vulnerabilities
  • Implementing defenses to well known attacks
  • Inventory of NPI data stored, on what servers, for what purposes
  • Secure deletion of NPI once it is no longer needed
These are all really good points that should be considered for controls in any organization, especially with any compliance requirements (SEC, NASD, HIPAA, state privacy laws, etc.). How to establish and then prove that these controls exist and are effective is the "fun part".

->Pierre

Comments

Unknown said…
Great post--one of the driving forces behind my interest in Windows 2008 domains is the new "granular password policy" feature. Used to be that you got one password policy per account database (domain). Now, you can dump administrators into a separate OU and have a much more rigorous password policy for them, and God forbid even go so far as to require two-factor authentication for all admins. Oh, the humanity...
April 24, 2009 at 10:36 AM
Pierre said…
I didn't know 2008 was going to support that, that is pretty huge! From a policy perspective I know I've usually written in the Admin level accounts need additional complexity or factors for authentication, and also additional process for validation/re-verification of account need. Nice to know we can actually live up to that now in a 2008 environment. Now just to deploy one.. :)
April 24, 2009 at 10:55 AM
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